

Study Guide
for
NATO's North Atlantic Council

**Topic Area: Addressing the issues of money laundering
and preventing the financing of terrorism**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. WELCOMING LETTER

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

2.1. Historical Background

2.2. NATO Treaty

2.3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2.4 The North Atlantic Council

3. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

3.1 Historical Background and Definition

3.2 Air Policing Mission: The Basics

3.2.1 NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD)

3.2.2 NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS)

3.3. Air Policing

3.3.1 NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS)

3.3.2 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

3.3.3. Allied Air Command (AIRCOM)

3.3.4 Regional Assistance

3.4 Regional Air Policing Missions

3.4.1 Baltic Area

3.4.2 Eastern Adriatic

3.4.3 Iceland

3.4.4 Benelux

4. READINESS ACTION PLAN

4.1 Assurance Measures

4.2 Adaptation Measures

5. CHALLENGES

5.1 Internal Challenges

5.1.1 Air Defense and European Self-Reliance

5.1.2 Readiness

5.1.3 Consensus Mechanism

5.2 External Challenges

5.2.1 Ukrainian War

5.2.2 Strategic Airlift

5.2.3 Cyber Threats

5.2.4 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)

6. COOPERATION WITH THE E.U

6.1 Framework for Cooperation

7. CONCLUSION (recap, express the problems arising, address some possible solution)

8. POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED

9. BIBLIOGRAPHY

10. FURTHER READING

1. WELCOMING LETTER:

Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) of RhodesMRC 2023. We feel both honored and excited to serve on the Board of this iconic committee, especially since 2023 promises a high-level conference with honored guests and exciting surprises. This year's topic, 'NATO AND AIR DOMAIN: *UPDATING THE SECURITY OF ALLIED AIRSPACE*', revolves around today's complicated air security environment. NATO's airspace is one of the most sacred parts of the Alliance's collective defense. At a time of high risk, when Europe's national sovereignty is hanging on by a thread, threatened by conventional and unconventional dangers, the need to reassess and upgrade air dynamics is more urgent than ever. NATO, possessing the necessary logistical structure and decision-making policy, has laid a solid foundation for air security. Of all the range of challenges facing the Alliance, the greatest enemy is complacency. We are entering a period of intense internal turmoil, where a lack of resources is leading to overspending of defense costs by strong allies, the complexity of the decision-making system may offer security but also delay, and new external risks are showcasing the flaws in the Alliance's air security system. Will NATO be able to meet the demands of the new era? In this study guide, we aim to provide you with all the relevant background information that will help you understand the topic in depth. Additionally, we strived to incentivize you to conduct your research as well, which is always necessary to fully grasp every aspect of this highly complex international issue. **We urge you, almost demand, you start your research from the bibliography and further reading sections at the end of the guide. The topic at hand is extremely complex and difficult, which is why we have provided you with great sources that will help you understand the topic and find the right direction when composing your solutions!** On a special note, we kindly want to ask all of you to not only carefully read this study guide, but also the Rules of Procedure (RoP) of NATO's NAC. As familiar as we make ourselves with the topic of the committee, we can never fully shine as delegates without a firm grasp of the rules of the game. We are looking forward to meeting every one of you in person, on the beautiful island

of Rhodes. Should any questions arise concerning the conference, the committee, the topic, or the procedure, feel free to ask for our help and we'll be happy to assist you.

On behalf of the Organizing Team and the Secretariat, we welcome you to RhodesMRC 2023 and the island of Rhodes!

Best regards,

Alexia Papailiopoulos, *Secretary General*

Anna Pouliou, *Deputy Secretary General*

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE:

2.1 Historical Background

After World War II, most of the world, especially Europe, was left devastated, plagued by the ongoing refugee crisis, and destabilized by the destruction of its military forces. Simultaneously, the rise of Communism in many countries, through the Soviet Union, was perceived as a threat to American domination. NATO's visionaries felt the need to better confine the Soviet influence, to prevent further imperialistic tendencies in Europe, while also strengthening transatlantic relations. It was this vision that led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Organisation (NATO).¹

2.2 NATO Treaty

“The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments”

4th of April 1949: The United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom signed the North Atlantic Treaty² in Washington, DC, forming the strongest military alliance. Article 5 highlights the sole purpose of the alliance: “An armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all” and in such cases, each Ally would take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. Articles 2 and 3 immediately established a ground base for military and non-military cooperation between the Allies. However, only after the outbreak of the Korean War and the first detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, did the alliance create a consolidated command structure with military headquarters (based in the Parisian suburb of Rocquencourt, near Versailles). Hence, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE, had come to serve as a security umbrella for the coordination of this military alliance.³

¹ NATO. “NATO-Russia: Setting the Record Straight.” NATO. Accessed July 22, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm>.

² NATO. “NATO Member Countries.” NATO, n.d. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.

³ *ibid*

NATO was established as a deterrent to the threat that the Soviet Union posed at the time, as well as a guarantor against chauvinism and aggressive militarism in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, NATO embraced the doctrine of deterrence against the Members of the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance broadened its boundaries with the admission of new member states and put all its efforts into keeping ahead in the arms race with the Soviet Union. Eventually, NATO's strategy against the communist threat paid off, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War in favor of the West.⁴

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 seemed to proclaim a new era of open markets, democracy, and peace, and the Allies reacted with incredulous joy as emboldened demonstrators overthrew Eastern European Communist governments. But there were also frightening uncertainties. With aggressive chauvinism and militarism in Europe belonging to the past, and the communist threat gone, many questioned the need for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

NATO endured because while the Soviet Union was no more, the Alliance's two other initial, if unspoken, mandates still held: to deter the rise of militant chauvinism and to provide the foundation of collective security that would encourage democratization and political integration in Europe. Several new member States were admitted, and the definition of 'Europe' expanded eastward.

Before the consolidation of peace and security could begin, the issue of coming to terms with a united Germany, a permanent concern for European politics since the second half of the nineteenth century, had to be resolved. The incorporation of a re-unified Germany into the Alliance put this most ancient and destructive of dilemmas to rest.

Skepticism around whether NATO had still a place in the global spectrum as a guarantor of peace and security remained. Many voices strongly maintained that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an era in which the Western Democracies would face no threats to their Liberty and Security, leading to an identity crisis of the Alliance.⁵

However, those voices have been proven over-optimistic, as the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, the Syrian conflict, and, lately, the Russian invasion of

⁴ "A Short History Of NATO", NATO, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm.

⁵ Alex Gatopoulos, "Desperately Seeking Relevance: NATO In The 21st Century", Aljazeera.Com, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/6/14/desperately-seeking-relevance-nato-in-the-21st-century>

Ukraine are the modern-day threats that create the need not only for peace-making but also for peacekeeping policies. Has NATO fulfilled those purposes? Only time will tell. But the Russian–Ukrainian War strongly indicates what the world seems to forget sometimes: the alliance is – above all – a military cooperation.

2.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe established by the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) on April 4, 1949, which sought to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in central and Eastern Europe after World War II. Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁶

NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community. The alliance's fundamental goal remains the need to safeguard its Allies' freedom and security via political and military means. When it comes to political means, NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust, and prevent conflict. Even though NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, the alliance has the military power to undertake crisis management operations. These are carried out under the "collective defense" clause, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.⁷

2.4 The North Atlantic Council

The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance. It brings together representatives of each member country to discuss policy or

⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica. "North Atlantic Treaty Organization | History, Structure & Purpose," n.d. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization>

⁷What is NATO? "What Is NATO?," January 1, 2001. <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

operational questions requiring collective decisions, providing a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security.⁸

Decision-making⁹

For a decision to be made by the Council, a consensus is required; that means that all member-states have to agree for the decision to pass. In this process, a decision by the majority is not allowed. This need for common acceptance of the Council's decisions means that policies decided upon by the NAC translate the expression of the collective will of all the member states. It is crucial to note that each member has an equal weight in the conversation and all members have equal votes. The Chair of the meetings is the Secretary-General or, in his/her absence, the Deputy Secretary-General.

At the level of permanent representatives, the Council meets every week. A permanent representative voices the views of his/her country, and mainly explains the logic behind the country's policymaking. The Council can also meet at the level of ministers of Foreign Affairs, ministers of Defence, or even Heads of State/Government.

The Council often publishes declarations and communiqués, which are public documents that explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm the Allies' support for aspects of NATO policies.

10

Funding:¹¹

In terms of funding NATO and its facilities, every member state shall contribute at least 2% of its GDP to the costs. However, the Allies' biggest contribution consists of taking part in NATO-led missions and operations by providing fighter jets, ships, equipment, or troops.

International Cooperation:

To overcome the various global threats that NATO is facing, the alliance invests in cooperation with over 40 external partners, including countries around the world, as well as organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization for

⁸ "North Atlantic Council (NAC)", NATO, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49763.htm.

⁹ "Consensus Decision-Making At NATO", NATO, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm

¹⁰ "Summit Meetings", NATO, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm.

¹¹ NATO. "10 Things You Need to Know about NATO." NATO, n.d. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm>.

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU), to spread stability and security.¹²

3. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC:

NATO is widely regarded as the world's most powerful military alliance. The punch of its air forces is a critical component of its might. However, this element, known as "air power" in specialist circles, should not be regarded as unchangeable. On the contrary, it must be adapted to current and future security policy issues to meet the needs connected with aggressor deterrence and the performance of current mission-related activities.¹³

Superior air forces are a requirement for deterring Russia as a prospective adversary. If that deterrence fails, aircraft would be the most effective option for fighting a conventional Russian strike. For many years, this was not a major concern. Instead, in recent years, the air forces of various NATO countries, particularly those of the United States, have played a critical role in combating the so-called Islamic State (ISIL). They are currently flying hard missions over Syria and Iraq, as they did in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but they are experiencing no notable threats from the air or the ground.

However, it is precisely the difficult relationship with Russia that necessitates NATO's air forces outperforming a possible enemy with full spectrum capability. On the one hand, asserting supremacy against a difficult adversary necessitates early-warning capabilities that prolong response time. On the other hand, rapid and superior crisis reaction troops must be capable of intercepting and defeating attackers in the air as soon as possible.

Optimizing these two high-tech capabilities requires money, and given the current economic success, resources must be pumped back into the forces. NATO states' financial strength does not generate military power, a power which is the critical cornerstone of any deterrent. Armed forces can only be adequately equipped if appropriate financing is provided. Effective deterrence cannot be ensured unless such forces are adequately trained, fully operational, and fully available to NATO.

¹² *ibid*

¹³ Hähnlein, Rayk. "Air Power: Credible Deterrence and Defence Call for Superior Air Forces. NATO Has Realised That." Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22201>.

The concept of military power is associated with great expectations. The forces must be long-lasting, durable, deployable, interoperable, and capable of undertaking operations spanning the entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear deterrence activities. No value is more fundamentally important for NATO than coherence, or reliable cohesion, especially during times of stress. Potential adversaries understand that if they wish to undercut NATO's legitimacy, they must weaken this vulnerable point. That is what Russia is aiming for by bringing potential nuclear counter-attacks into play if NATO launches an Article V reaction. Such rhetoric is intended to undermine the Alliance's credibility. In turn, joint military strength is the most effective solution, since strength breeds confidence, and if you are confident, you exude credibility and are difficult to scare.

At a time when policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Moscow are attempting to define and agree on a single capability to defend the EuroAtlantic against missile threats, a comprehensive analysis of "bottom-up" cooperative prospects in aviation security is in order following this vision. Extending ongoing cooperative airspace security projects is a cost-effective and technically feasible endeavor that could promote both agreement and action on the rules of engagement, as well as the sharing of information, technology, and costs in regional missile defense involving Russia. To make the Euro-Atlantic security "indivisible," it may be essential to learn from previous experience with using this form of functional engagement for reassurance.¹⁴

The rapid detection, tracking, communication, and coordination of a response to threats to and from the region's airspace is a recurring worry among Euro-Atlantic policymakers and military strategists. Airborne terrorism is a high-impact threat that has no borders and manifests itself in a variety of ways. Terrorist attempts to exploit passenger aviation and related infrastructure through hijacking, explosion assaults, shoulder-launched weapon attacks, and the potential "seizure of civil aircraft for use as "manned missiles" are persistent features on the threat landscape. Terrorist attacks using radar-evading Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and cruise missiles with explosive or unusual payloads are also likely in the future, befuddling security bureaucracies.

¹⁴ Loukianova, Anya. "Cooperative Airspace Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region." Center for International & Security Studies, U. Maryland, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04999>.

3.1 Historical background and definition:

62 years of Air Policing:

Since 1961, during the Cold War, NATO has been committed to safeguarding the allied air space in case of suspicious or unannounced flights. Air Policing has been an essential part of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence for 62 years, extending from Iceland in the north to the Black Sea on its south-eastern border.¹⁵

Following the terrorist attack on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, many states have considered how they can best address aerial threats caused by renegade aircraft, that is, aircraft used by those exercising control over them to inflict harm, to influence public opinion, democratic decision-making processes, and/or policy decisions of one or more States. The most significant measure towards addressing aerial threats has been "statutory legislation", authorizing national air forces to fire down renegade aircraft. After 9/11 statutory legislation was established in, among other places, Russia, Poland, and Slovakia; by contrast, the Prime Minister of France already had the authority to order the downing of a renegade aircraft. In Germany, a similar clause was included in the Aviation Security Act, but it was found unlawful and invalid by the Federal Constitutional Court on February 15, 2006. The direct conclusion drawn by the efforts to respond to aerial threats after 2001, is that states were in urgent need to legalize any action necessary to confront renegade aircraft. To achieve that, states had to examine the suspicious air movements from a legal point of view, and they did so mostly within the context of military actions. This starting point is also found in NATO's Air Policy; it's nothing more or less than its definition.¹⁶

Record 4144/ AAP-06: Air Policing: A peacetime mission involving the use of the air surveillance and control system, air command and control, and appropriate air defense assets, including interceptors, to preserve the integrity of the NATO airspace part of Alliance airspace (*Source: C-M(2019)0032 (INV)*).¹⁷ This definition does not explain what means and measures are available, nor which of those accessible should be prioritized in maintaining

¹⁵ Nato, "Safe Skies: 60 Years of NATO Air Policing," NATO, accessed August 12, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185683.htm.

¹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁷ Natotermotan, accessed August 12, 2023, <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc>.

airspace integrity. NATO member states can thereby contribute to NATO air policing without regard to various legal responsibilities or interpretations of shared legal requirements.¹⁸

The nature of the threat posed by an airspace breach is frequently unknown. In the lack of other information, civil aircraft, especially those operating in normally restricted airspace, are generally protected by international civil aviation rules from being automatically labeled renegade and thus, punished accordingly. States that are not bound by international civil aviation law may be required to follow comparable requirements under relevant international human rights law. NATO's concept of "air policing" was developed before September 11, 2001, that is before the UN Security Council affirmed that the inherent right to self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) can be activated by and exercised against non-governmental actors. Such acts may not only be carried out by misusing a 'civil aircraft,' but they may also take place in a circumstance that is nominally characterized as 'peacetime,' but commences or sustains a non-international armed war. As a result, this definition is insufficient to cover the full range of military and international law implications of counter-renegade action. Eventually, as we have already mentioned, the legal interpretation of this term must rely on the meaning given within the context of military operations.

3.2 Air Policing Mission: The Basics

Because of the asymmetric and irregular threats that saw the light after 9/11, the military and government have been preoccupied with the issue of air policing. Air Policing is defined by NATO as a specialized DCA (Defensive Counter Air) fighter task, OPCON/TACON (Operational Control/Tactical Control) to an Air Operation Center during peacetime to maintain 24/7 control over an allocated AOR. This is the standard technique for conducting Air Policing for airspace control in all European NATO countries, and it was also adopted by the US Air Force for homeland security following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The NATO/USAF approach is to accomplish Air Policing as a DCA mission (warfighting) with applicability during

¹⁸Ulf Haubler, "Air Policing and Counter-Renegade Action: Options beyond the German Aviation Security Act," *Military Law and Law of War Review* 48, no. Issues 1 and 2 (2009): 7-80

peace (or, in the worst case, during crises) with very specific TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).¹⁹

NATO Air Policing is a peacetime collective defense duty that ensures the integrity of the airspace of NATO Alliance members. The idea of collective defense was the primary focus of NATO's founding treaty, and it continues to be a unique and enduring value that bonds its members together, binding them to protect one another and establishing a culture of solidarity within the Alliance. All NATO member countries participate in air policing in some way, whether through the deployment of national aerial surveillance systems, air traffic management, interceptor aircraft, or other air defense capabilities.²⁰ It is a clear demonstration of the Alliance's coherence, shared responsibility, and solidarity.²¹

NATO Air Policing forces provide support to civilian aircraft in distress — ~~for example when they have lost communication with air traffic control.~~ The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) is the system in charge of carrying out the NATO Air Policing Mission and The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is in charge of the mission's overall execution. The NATO Air Policing mission is overseen by Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), which is headquartered in Ramstein, Germany, with 24/7 command and control from two Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs): one in Torrejón, Spain, which covers European NATO airspace south of the Alps, and one in Uedem, Germany, which covers the north. When an interception is required, the relevant CAOC determines which Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) interceptor aircraft will be scrambled (i.e. tasked to respond within minutes) based on the location of the incident.

NATO Air Policing scrambles to respond to military and civilian aircraft that violate international flight standards and fly too close to Allies' airspace. As a result, such aircraft generate hazardous conditions, such as air-to-air collisions, or these actions may suggest hostile conduct, such as hijackings. NATO Air Policing responses aim to protect the airspace and its users. NATO Air Policing will continue to respond to aircraft that do not conform to international flight norms or operate near NATO borders

¹⁹ Mircea Petrescu, "The Air Policing – One Notion, Two Approaches," Defense Resources Management in the 21st Century, January 1, 1970, <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=669424>.

²⁰ NATO air policing the peacetime collective - proquest, accessed August 12, 2023, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2157829629?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>.

²¹ Nato, "Nato Air Policing: Securing Allied Airspace," NATO, August 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm.

How does an air policing intercept work in practical terms?²²

Allied radars detect a track of interest among the 30,000 plane movements that occur daily within European airspace. If the corresponding aircraft is not squawking (using its transponder), is not in radio contact with civilian air traffic control, or has not filed a flight plan, the track is reported to one of the two NATO CAOCs (at Uedem, Germany, and Torrejon, Spain), which decides whether or not to launch a Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) aircraft from one of the Allies' air bases on 24-hour standby for such missions. The QRA(I) jet is launched and brought up close to the unidentified aircraft by a Control and Reporting Centre.²³

NATO Air Policing jets undertake their scrambles per the applicable International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and NATO documents. This guarantees that the intercepted aircraft's pilot maintains visual contact and is aware of how the interception is progressing. Priority number one is to ensure flight safety. This is exacerbated further by national flying regulations.

The CAOC will monitor the whole operation and report to HQ AIRCOM, where all intercept information is recorded in the Air Policing and Reporting division. A Combined Air Operation Centre initiates all scrambles, which are carried out with NATO-assigned aircraft.

The General Outline:

- 1. Threat Identification:** NATO continuously monitors the airspace over its member countries to detect potential threats, including unauthorized or unidentified aircraft approaching their airspace.
- 2. Request for Assistance:** If a member country detects a threat or perceives a need for additional air defense, it can request NATO's assistance in providing air policing services.
- 3. Activation of Air Policing Mission:** Upon receiving a request for assistance, NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) Center in Germany activates an air-policing mission. This center oversees the coordination of air defense assets in NATO.

²² "We Secure the Skies," ac.nato.int, accessed August 12, 2023, <https://ac.nato.int/missions/air-policing>.

²³ "NATO Air Policing." *Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review* no. 3 (May, 2022): 89-90. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/nato-air-policing/docview/2675250969/se-2>.

4. **Rotational Deployment:** NATO member countries that possess fighter aircraft and have agreed to participate in the Air Policing mission then deploy their aircraft on a rotational basis to the requesting country's territory.
5. **Intercept and Identification:** Once deployed, the fighter aircraft patrol the airspace of the requesting country, ready to intercept and identify any unauthorized or potentially hostile aircraft. They visually identify the aircraft, establish radio communication, and assess the situation to determine its intentions.
6. **Rules of Engagement:** The deployed fighter aircraft operate under NATO's agreed-upon rules of engagement, which dictate the circumstances under which they can use force, including firing warning shots or engaging hostile aircraft.
7. **Coordination and Communication:** During the air policing mission, constant communication is maintained between the deployed aircraft, NATO's IAMD Center, and the air traffic control of the requesting country to ensure a seamless and effective response to any potential threats.
8. **Mission Conclusion:** Once the threat is resolved or the requesting country's air force regains its capability to handle air defense independently, the air policing mission is concluded. The deployed fighter aircraft return to their home bases and the requesting country's air force resumes its regular air defense operations.

NATO's Air Defense: The system

NATO's air defense system is based on a combination of assets from member countries and integrated command structures.

NATO's air defense system includes a variety of capabilities, such as:

1. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): NATO has developed an integrated approach to air and missile defense, combining various air and missile defense systems from different member countries. This integration allows for better coordination and interoperability among the participating forces.

2. Air Surveillance and Early Warning: NATO uses a network of ground-based radars, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and space-based assets to detect and track potential threats in the airspace.

3. Air-to-Air Interceptors: Member countries contribute their fighter aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles to intercept and engage hostile aircraft that may threaten NATO airspace.

4. Ground-Based Air Defense Systems: NATO deploys and coordinates ground-based air defense systems, which may include anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, and other defensive measures to protect critical assets and infrastructure from aerial threats.

5. Cyber Defense: In the modern digital age, NATO also emphasizes cyber defense to protect its air defense systems and other military assets from cyber threats and attacks.

3.2.1 NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD)²⁴

NATO's IAMD stands for "Integrated Air and Missile Defense." It refers to a strategic concept and operational framework adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect its member states from air and missile threats. IAMD is designed to defend against a wide range of airborne threats, including manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and other advanced weapons that can be launched from the air or space. The goal of NATO's IAMD is to provide a layered defense that can counter these threats at different stages of their trajectory, from their launch to their final approach.

The concept of IAMD involves a combination of sensors, command and control systems, and various defensive measures, such as anti-aircraft weapons, missile interceptors, and electronic warfare capabilities. These components work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming threats to protect critical assets and population centers within NATO's territory.

²⁴ Nato, "Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD)," NATO, June 13, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_8206.htm.

- NATO IAMD can address threats from the air, on land, or at sea, which may include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, as well as electromagnetic and cyber threats, as well as the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats from other state and non-state actors, ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to sophisticated missile capabilities, like hypersonic missiles.
- The center provides training, education, doctrine development, analysis, and other support services to NATO and its member nations to improve their IAMD capabilities.

Effectiveness:²⁵

The central contention of the critics against NATO's IAMD²⁶ is that it is neither conceptually nor functionally connected with the larger campaign-level operational strategy required to prevail in a serious confrontation with a peer competitor.

IAMD, as currently envisioned in the NATO setting, is out of step with the re-emerging requirements of great power competition. The existing NATO approach to IAMD, which was designed to guarantee protection against a limited air threat from Iran, will be strained against a major power. The current missile defense threat is thought to be mostly posed by a limited number of medium- to long-range regional ballistic missiles.²⁷ While NATO discusses IAMD missions such as cruise missile defense, counter-UAV, and defense against tactical ballistic missiles, in practice, these systems are developed at a national level, in tandem with overall European territorial defense via NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD).²⁸

²⁵ "The Future of NATO's Air and Missile Defence," Royal United Services Institute, July 12, 2021, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/future-nato-air-and-missile-defence>.

²⁶ (meaning defense against all manner of damaging objects arriving in the atmosphere, including ballistic, strike and cruise missiles, and UAVs. This includes rockets, artillery, and mortars, but generally the challenge of defeating them is left to shorter-range air defence systems associated with manoeuvre forces

²⁷ NATO, 'Brussels Summit Declaration', 11 July 2018 (updated 27 August 2018), , accessed 7 April 2021.

²⁸ Luc Dini, 'Air and Missile Defence in Europe: Building a Consensus', Friends of Europe, 1 April 2015, accessed 9 April 2021.

3.2.2 NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS)²⁹

NATO's Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is a sophisticated network-centric system designed to provide comprehensive command and control capabilities for NATO's air operations. It facilitates the planning, tasking, execution, and monitoring of air missions to ensure effective coordination and management of air assets across NATO member countries.

The ACCS is intended to improve the situational awareness of NATO's air forces by integrating various sensors, communication systems, and command centers. It allows commanders to monitor the airspace, identify potential threats, and respond quickly to emerging situations. The Air Command and Control System (ACCS), currently under procurement by NACMA,³⁰ is NATO's first fully integrated system, allowing for planning, automatic tasking, battlespace management, and task execution for all forms of air operations. The system has a centralized command and a dispersed execution capacity, allowing it to meet NATO commanders' needs for air operations planning and execution. ACCS entities can be constructed as static or deployable components, depending on the operational commanders' requirements. ACCS interacts with a wide range of NATO, national, and civilian organizations, allowing data to be collected from a variety of sources and used to generate a recognized COP.

Key components of NATO's Air Command and Control System include:

- 1. Air Operations Centers (AOCs):** These are the primary command and control centers responsible for overseeing air operations in specific regions. Each AOC is responsible for a designated area of responsibility and is staffed by personnel from the respective member nations.
- 2. Sensors and Radars:** The ACCS integrates data from various sensors and radars, such as ground-based surveillance radars and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, to provide real-time information about the air situation.

²⁹“Air Command and Control System (ACCS) // <![CDATA[_spbodyonloadfunctionnames.Push('setuppagedescriptioncallout'); //]>,” NCI Agency AMDC2, accessed August 12, 2023, <https://npc.ncia.nato.int/Pages/accs.aspx>.

³⁰ the Agency conducts the central planning, system engineering, implementation and configuration management for NATO's Air Command and Control (Air C2) systems.

- 3. Communication Systems:** Robust and secure communication links are essential for the timely exchange of information between different elements of the system, including aircraft, ground-based units, and command centers.
- 4. Command and Control Software:** The ACCS relies on sophisticated software applications to process data, support decision-making, and disseminate orders and directives.
- 5. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System:** The IFF system helps in distinguishing between friendly and hostile aircraft, reducing the risk of friendly fire incidents.
- 6. Link 16 Data Link:** NATO forces often use the Link 16 data link to facilitate real-time data exchange, including tactical information, between aircraft, ships, and ground units.

The ACCS aims to enhance the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO air forces, enabling them to respond more effectively to various types of missions, including air defense, surveillance, reconnaissance, and air support for ground operations.

3.3 Air Policing

NATO Air Policing is a peacetime mission that aims to preserve the security of Alliance airspace. It is a collective task and involves the continuous presence of fighter aircraft and crews, which are ready to react quickly to possible airspace violations.³¹ In these missions, several NATO mechanisms contribute, which we will analyze further: NATINAMDS, the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Allied Air Command (AIRCOM). In a few words, air policing missions involve the continuous surveillance and control of a country or region's airspace to ensure its security and protect against potential threats. These missions are

³¹ NATO, "Nato Air Policing: Securing Allied Airspace," NATO, August 4, 2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm#:~:text=Established%20in%201961%20during%20the,\(IAMD\)%20for%2060%20years.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm#:~:text=Established%20in%201961%20during%20the,(IAMD)%20for%2060%20years.)

typically carried out by military aircraft, often fighter jets, and are part of collective defense efforts.

3.3.1 NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS)

The NATO Air Policing mission is carried out using the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). The NATINAMDS is a network of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensors, command and control assets, and weapons systems. Its objective is to defend NATO forces, populations, and territory from threats emanating from all strategic directions. It is a highly responsive system, which is prepared to employ all necessary measures to deter any air and missile threat, to nullify or reduce their effectiveness, in times of crisis or conflict.

3.3.2 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has the overall responsibility for the conduct of the mission. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is one of NATO's two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied Command Operations (ACO). SACEUR is responsible to NATO's highest military authority – the Military Committee (MC) – for the conduct of all NATO military operations.³²

SACEUR is responsible for the overall command of NATO military operations. It conducts the necessary military planning for operations, including the identification of forces required for the mission, and requests these forces from NATO countries, as authorized by the North Atlantic Council and as directed by the MC. SACEUR analyses these operational needs in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

³²"Topic: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)." 2022. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm.

3.3.3 Allied Air Command (AIRCOM)

Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), headquartered in Ramstein, Germany, oversees the NATO Air Policing mission with 24/7 command and control from two Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs): one in Torrejón, Spain, which covers European NATO airspace south of the Alps, and one in Uedem, Germany covering the north. When an interception is required – in the case of airspace violations, suspicious air activity close to the Alliance’s borders, or other kinds of unsafe air traffic that does not adhere to international air safety norms – the relevant CAOC decides which Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) interceptor aircraft will be scrambled (i.e. tasked to react within minutes) according to the location of the incident.

3.3.4 Regional Assistance³³

NATO member countries supply the required aircraft and assets for air policing their airspace under the supervision of SACEUR. Other NATO members aid those countries that lack the required resources to maintain the integrity of their sovereign airspace. NATO presently has five regional air policing missions under its command.

3.4 Regional Air Policing Missions

As European airspace is one of the busiest in the world, the need for continuing safeguarding is fundamental for regional security. For this purpose, NATO member countries contribute with the necessary aircraft and assets to the Air Policing of the European airspace. This cooperation among states is coordinated by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which conducts all NATO military operations and is responsible to the Military Committee (MC).³⁴ As for the states that are not equipped with adequate means to achieve this objective, it is within the ideals of the alliance that the other NATO members preserve the integrity of their sovereign airspace. To systematize this assistance, NATO, at the moment, oversees 5 regional air policing missions.

³³ Nato, "Nato Air Policing: Securing Allied Airspace," NATO, August 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm.

³⁴"Topic: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)." 2022. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm.


3.4.1 Baltic Area

Threats in the Baltic Area

The Baltic area has been a complex security environment, that during the Cold War era had epitomized bipolar geopolitics and now faces the threats of Russia's aggression. NATO's responsibility to ensure the integrity, safety, and security of its airspace is of utmost importance given many factors that can cause destabilization in the area.

First of all, the geographical proximity of the Baltic states to Russia. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and now Finland are located in a region that forms a critical link between Northern Europe and Russia. At the same time, all of them share borders with Russia resulting in general vulnerability and insecurity of the eastern flank of NATO. This insecurity was augmented after the Ukrainian War, where Baltic states prioritized the need to be protected from Russia's potential aggression towards them.

Western Military District (MD)



Source: Author's findings. (All maps were designed and created by Piotr Wawrzekiewicz.)

Following that, the presence of Russia in such small proximity has posed security concerns, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Ukraine, which are increased by the military build-up near its borders with the Baltics. More precisely, Russia has reinforced its so-called Western Military District (MD), with new or modernized equipment and organizational reforms. The district contains

26 federal subjects of Russia such as Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, etc.

In Western MD are based 3 out of the 4 airborne divisions in the Russian armed forces (one air assault, two parachutes), confirming its objective to maintain a strong airborne forces presence towards the West, and thus increasing the need for deterrence and defense on the part of the Northern Alliance. The two key regions for Western MD are the heavily militarized cities of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. St. Petersburg is the second most heavily guarded city after Moscow and the headquarters of the 6th AADA. A self-sufficient fighting force has been established in the Kaliningrad Oblast with units based there, that can undertake both defensive and offensive operations.³⁵

The Suwalki Gap

Furthermore, while examining the security concerns in the area, we should not ignore the hot spot of the Suwałki Gap. It is an area of low population density located in southwest of the border between Lithuania and Poland, between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast.



³⁵"Russian Forces in the Western Military District." 2021. CNA.org. https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/russian-forces-in-the-western-military-district.pdf.

The integration of Poland and Lithuania in the Alliance resulted, on the one hand, in a surround effect in the Kaliningrad exclave but, on the other, creating a need to protect the narrow corridor of Suwalki, which could become a passage for Russian troops in a potential NATO-Russia conflict through the Baltic area. In the event of this scenario, the Baltic states would be surrounded by Russia, Russian-controlled territories, and Belarus, the Russian ally. Even though the two Russia-aligned states are not physically present in this corridor, its narrowness allows the stationing of short-range rockets in either country, to threaten NATO's military supplies.³⁶ For this reason, the preservation of security in the area is of utmost importance and has to be one of the top-ranked priorities of NATO Air Policing in the Baltic area.

Baltic Air Policing Mission

Taking into consideration the concentration of Russian military bases in the Baltic area, NATO's presence in the region serves as a signal of assurance to its member states and a deterrent to potential aggressors. By demonstrating its commitment to the security of the Baltic states, NATO aims to prevent any aggressive actions or military adventurism in the region. The Baltic Air Policing mission is structured as follows:

This mission is a NATO air defense Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) mission to safeguard, surveil, and protect the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is within NATO's responsibility to provide equal protection to the countries within the alliance, to ensure the collective defense effect of Art 5, and to deter any potential threats. Therefore, because its three Baltic members have not acquired the required aircraft assets to contribute to NATO Air Policing over their territories, the rest of the Alliance members are going to provide the necessary capabilities for them.


On a 4-month rotation, allied states deploy military personnel and equipment at the 2 air bases of the Baltic Area. The first air base is located in Šiauliai, Lithuania and the second one is at Ämari Air Base.³⁷

³⁶ Parafianowicz, Ryszard. "The military-geographical significance of the Suwałki Gap". Security and Defence Quarterly 17 no. 4 (2017): 3-20. doi:10.5604/01.3001.0011.7839.

³⁷"Allied Air Command | 2016." n.d. Allied Air Command. Accessed August 12, 2023. <https://ac.nato.int/archive/2020/lithuanian-air-force-air-base-at-Siauliai-to-host-53rd-nato-detachment>.

These deployments and training exercises serve the purpose of NATO's cohesion, solidarity, and readiness in an area, where Russian Air Force activity is frequent due to the geographical proximity of Kaliningrad, thus increasing the need for preparedness. The reported incidents of the approach of allied airspace of such aircraft are daily and are usually conducted without using transponders, communicating with Air Traffic Control, or having filed a flight plan.

3.4.2 East Adriatic and Western Balkans



The region of Western Balkans has been an area of dispute in the recent past due to unresolved ethnic and political tensions. The Western Balkans have a history of ethnic and political tensions that led to conflicts about 35 years ago. Despite progress in some areas, these issues are not fully resolved, and there is still potential for flare-ups or escalations, which could impact regional stability and NATO's security interests.

Just as the four Balkans States, NATO members Albania, Slovenia, Republic of North Macedonia, and Montenegro don't have the required aircraft assets to contribute to NATO Air Policing over their territories. Hence the skies over these countries are secured by other Allies' Air Forces.

In the case of Albania and Montenegro, the mission is executed jointly by the Italian and the Greek Air Force. In November 2021, the Greek Air Force assumed responsibility for safeguarding North Macedonia's airspace under the NATO air policing mission umbrella.

In the case of Slovenia, efforts are shared between the Italian and the Hungarian Air Force. Lastly, the Croatian Air Force is the only Ally on the eastern Adriatic Sea that flies Air Policing missions with its fighter aircraft closely integrated into the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS).

3.4.3 Iceland

The collective Air Policing posture enables the Alliance to detect, track, and identify to the greatest extent possible all aerial objects approaching NATO airspace so that violations can be recognized early, and appropriate action taken, as Iceland does not have an air force of its own, to meet Iceland's need for peacetime preparedness and airspace surveillance, NATO provides a periodic presence for air surveillance and interception capabilities in the air base located in Keflavik.³⁸

Until 2006, NATO conducted a permanent air policing mission in the area. However, the security priorities changed and NATO was focused more on the mainland of Europe. After the end of the Cold War, the security environment in Europe shifted significantly. The perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the need for a strong NATO presence in Iceland diminished.

Moreover, NATO focused on enlargement, bringing in new member states from Central and Eastern Europe and the alliance's security concerns shifted towards them. Therefore, after political dialogue between NATO and Iceland and the request of the Icelandic government for a non-permanent force at Keflavik, they decided on a periodical deployment of fighter aircraft instead starting in 2008. More precisely, The mission is called Iceland Air Policing (IAP) and it is conducted by NATO member countries for three to four weeks at a time, three times per year.³⁹

³⁸Andreas, Ole. 2023. "Iceland Air Policing - Norwegian Armed Forces." Forsvaret. <https://www.forsvaret.no/en/exercises-and-operations/international-operations/iceland-air-policing>.

³⁹"Topic: NATO Air Policing: securing Allied airspace." 2023. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm.

3.4.4 Benelux



In the context of coherent and collective preservation of airspace security within the Alliance, in 2017 Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg (BENELUX) signed a new arrangement for NATO Air Policing. This arrangement serves the purposes of national security of the states and of readiness of the BENELUX states to come up with a rapid response to any suspicious or unauthorized aircraft as this air policing mission involves the quick deployment of fighter aircraft to intercept and assess potential threats.

The Ministers of Defence of Belgium and the Netherlands officially announced this new way of executing the peacetime mission of Air Policing in March 2015. On 21st December, the technical arrangement (TA) was signed by the Dutch Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Belgian Commander of the Air Component, and the Ambassador of Luxembourg. As the State of Luxembourg does not have an air force of its own to defend the allied airspace, this rotational integrated Air Policing arrangement makes it possible to achieve synergies that can be used to better sustain upcoming tasks for both Allied air forces and preserve the airspace security of Luxembourg. The arrangements coordinated among the three Allies cover a common area of interest, the airspace of Benelux, and include provision for border-crossing activities of aircraft assigned to NATO Air Policing. NATO cites the arrangement as another example of Smart Defence – pooling and sharing military capabilities among Allied Nations. The BENELUX air policing mission is controlled by NATO's Combined

Air Operations Centre at Uedem, Germany, part of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence System. Such cooperation is seen as a way to help generate modern defense capabilities in a more cost-efficient, effective, and coherent manner.

4. READINESS ACTION PLAN

NATO's Readiness Action Plan followed the illegitimate and illegal annexation of Crimea. It includes an increase in the military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, with "assurance measures", and longer-term changes to NATO's force posture referred to as "adaptation measures". The adaptation, long-term, measures were to increase the alliance's responsiveness and assist it when dealing with security challenges that given the period were focused more on the East (Russia) and the South (Middle East).

4.1 Assurance Measures⁴⁰

According to SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), the assurance measures focused on increasing military presence and activity for assurance and deterrence initially in the eastern part of the Alliance, as a demonstration of rapid and decisive response to reassure their populations and deter potential aggression. It was a series of measures that applied to all three: sea, land, and air.

Focusing on the airspace, assurance Measures include:

- Fighter jets on air-policing patrols.
- NATO AWACS surveillance flights over the territory of our eastern Allies, and aircraft flights along our eastern borders.
- Several Allies have also sent forces to Eastern Europe for training and exercises on a bilateral basis

⁴⁰ "NATO's Readiness Action Plan." 2016. Nato SHAPE. <https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/fact-sheets/factsheet-rap-en-2016.pdf>.

NATO conducted more exercises focused on crisis management and collective defense. Over 100 of the nearly 300 exercises conducted in 2015 were in support of NATO's assurance measures.

- Enhanced Air Policing

As a part of the broad set of assurance measures introduced following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Allies are providing additional assets to enhance air policing along NATO's eastern borders. To that end, the Allies supplemented the existing NATO Air Policing forces in the Baltic States, deployed additional aircraft to Poland, and augmented the national air policing capabilities of the Bulgarian and Romanian air forces.

NATO's Air Policing mission is enhanced across two Implementation Areas. NATO members are authorized and encouraged to provide additional assets to the Alliance supplementing existing Baltic Air Policing capabilities in the northern Implementation Area and, in parallel, augmenting national Air Policing capabilities in the southern Implementation Area.

However, most important for the present are the long-term changes that this event caused to the security of the airspace of the alliance. These changes as summed up with the Adaptation Measures altered the Alliance's long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise.

4.2 Adaptation Measures⁴¹

However, most important for the present are the long-term changes that this event caused to the security of the airspace of the alliance. These changes as summed up with the Adaptation Measures altered the Alliance's long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise.

These measures include:

- Making the NATO Response Force (NRF) more responsive and capable

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force that acts upon the land, air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces

⁴¹ "NATO's Readiness Action Plan." 2016. Nato SHAPE. <https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/fact-sheets/factsheet-rap-en-2016.pdf>.

(SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. In addition to its operational role, the NRF can be used for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises, support for disaster relief, and better use of technology. In 2015, the size of the NRF roughly tripled, from 13,000 to about 40,000 troops.

Within the NRF, a new quick-reaction “Spearhead Force” (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, or VJTF) was introduced and has been in the position to deploy within days wherever it is needed. In June 2015, the VJTF participated in its first deployment exercise: Noble Jump in Poland. It was tested again during Exercise Trident Juncture and has been part of NRF since 2016. Moreover, there were formed the Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG) which was a high-readiness force that could deploy quickly following the VJTF, in response to a crisis. The VJTF and Initial Follow-on Forces are based in their home countries but can deploy to wherever they are needed for exercises, crisis response, or collective defense.

- Establishing small multinational NATO headquarters - or “NATO Force Integration Units” (NFIUs)

To facilitate swift deployment of the VJTF, the alliance created NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), which are command-and-control and “force reception” facilities in member states in the eastern part of the alliance. NFIUs have been established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. They identify logistical networks and transportation infrastructure that the VJTF can use to deploy to a member state rapidly.⁴² The first NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) were activated in September 2015. Their task is to improve cooperation and coordination between NATO and national forces and prepare and support NRF exercises and any deployments needed.

Additional adaptation measures include:

- Establishing a new multinational divisional headquarters for the Southeast in Romania.
- Pre-positioning military supplies on the territory of eastern Allies.

⁴² Arnold, John-Michael. “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Strategic Benefits and Outstanding Challenges.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (2016): 74–105. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271088>.

- Improving NATO's ability to reinforce its eastern Allies through the preparation of national infrastructure, such as airfields and ports.
- Setting up a new standing Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters, to support deployed forces.

Overall, the Readiness Action Plan had 4 beneficial results for the Alliance's future:

1. **Deterrence Benefit:** The RAP strengthened NATO's deterrence capabilities using the credible threat of military response to discourage aggression. The increased military presence in NATO's eastern member states, particularly through the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), acted as a tripwire deterrent, signaling that any Russian aggression in the region could result in a broader alliance response.
2. **Defense Benefit:** If deterrence fails, the RAP provides NATO with additional defensive capabilities to counter potential Russian aggression
3. **Benefit of Depth:** The RAP allowed NATO to respond simultaneously to crises on both its eastern and southern flanks. With the VJTF capable of addressing challenges in the east, other NATO members, including the United States, can focus on responding to potential threats in the south.
4. **Deliverables Benefit:** The RAP provided member states with clear deliverables and objectives for their defense spending, giving them specific targets to achieve within shorter time frames.

5. CHALLENGES⁴³

In the recent decade, the environment for air defense planning and design has become significantly more complex. Previously, nations constructed their air defenses to counter foreign conventional threats. These threats largely included attacks by a huge number of fast military aircraft, helicopters, and missiles. Past and present air defense systems have been developed to engage threats efficiently after strategic warning, and especially after the start

⁴³ 1. Synthetic Environment for Robotics and Autonomous Systems - NATO, accessed August 12, 2023, <https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-SCI-341/MP-SCI-341-03.pdf>.

of the conflict. A secondary primary goal has been to monitor airspace in peacetime, detect, and, if necessary, intercept and eliminate invaders. Even the greatest defenses have occasionally failed to work satisfactorily in peacetime when not provided sufficient strategic notice of an impending attack. These failures have frequently had a substantial impact on international relations.

Whereas previous and current systems have tended to perform well during conventional conflict and unreliably during peacetime, future systems must be designed to operate in a more difficult environment: the unconventional "peacetime" environment, in which air defenses face non-traditional threats without the benefit of strategic warning and force generation.

The challenge of confronting future air defense systems is, in many ways, the inverse of what drove the development of legacy systems. Legacy systems were meant to defend against conventional nation-state strikes. Most importantly, future defenses must function without the benefit of strategic warning or force generation. Legacy systems could reasonably expect threats to originate outside of domestic airspace. Future systems must deal with threats that originate in domestic, foreign, or international airspace. The appearance of threats within domestic airspace reduces response times to tens of seconds to minutes and significantly enhances coverage rates for threat detection when compared to perimeter defense designs.

NATO's primary challenge is to devise and implement a plan that addresses the overall defensive problem while maintaining an acceptable economic impact - rather than adopting legacy system concepts and technologies in brute force, rapid-deployment solutions to the dilemma. Despite the sense of urgency generated by the 9/11 attacks, such a plan is unlikely to entail rapid leaps in capacity across the entire spectrum of threats. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States paid the fiscal and operational costs of trying such a leap. Hundreds of thousands of hours of AWACS and fighter-interceptor flight time were accumulated to build air defense capable of identifying and responding to unusual attacks without strategic warning.

5.1 INTERNAL CHALLENGES⁴⁴

5.1.1 AIR DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN SELF-RELIANCE:

Since 2008, the global economy has been currently experiencing its worst era since the conclusion of World War II. Governments are imposing budgetary constraints to combat the severe recession, which is significantly impacting defense spending. Furthermore, during this crisis, the Alliance's security environment has changed, becoming more diversified and unpredictable. Libya's crisis is a current example, highlighting the unpredictable nature of conflicts while also demonstrating the necessity for new systems and facilities, as well as decreased reliance on the United States for costly sophisticated capabilities.

In current times of turmoil, rebalancing defense spending between European nations and the United States is more important than ever. The other Allies need to narrow the gap with the US by equipping themselves with capabilities that are judged critical, deployable, and sustainable, and they must demonstrate political will to do so. The burden of defense must be shared equitably.

NATO has long set a defense spending target of 2% of each member country's GDP. Unfortunately, only eight countries, Greece, Poland, the UK, the US Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and new ally Finland met that target in 2022, while several cut back on spending.

Most of Europe is experiencing austerity, therefore states are carefully balancing defense resources between people, training, sustainment, present national operations, and future capabilities. Nations should consider making the same difficult decisions that the United States had to make to afford new military weapons.

Notably, it is a pay-your-own-way method when it comes to deployment for a NATO operation. The establishment of a single operations fund could promote higher state airpower participation in any NATO mission. However, building a single operational fund is difficult because NATO would have to seek donors or charge each nation a percentage of its defense

⁴⁴Franklin, Craig. "NATO Air Power: A Self-Reliant Europe?" American Enterprise Institute, 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03194>.

expenditure (or GDP). At this stage, it may be simpler to stick with the pay-your-own-way arrangement.

5.1.2 READINESS:

Regular NATO exercises are designed to sharpen the skills of NATO airmen at both the operator and command and control levels. Individual NATO nations also frequently hold or participate in bilateral and international exercises.

The Allied Air Command recently held its largest exercise to date, Ramstein Ambition II 2014, a computer-assisted, command-post exercise simulating continuous operations in which 400 pilots from 26 nations took part. Ramstein Ambition II 2014, according to General Gorenc, is a significant milestone on the road to AIRCOM's full operational capabilities. It is crucial to emphasize, however, that each country pays for its participation in most exercises. If NATO countries continue to cut defense spending, participation in NATO-level exercises and nationally hosted multilateral or bilateral training will almost surely decline. To avoid this, NATO and alliance armies should look into increasing the use of networked, high-end simulators.

5.1.3 CONSENSUS MECHANISM:

All NATO decisions are decided by consensus following discussions and consultations that allow alliance members to exchange ideas and information. Certainly, this approach can result in well-considered acts with extensive discussions of potential unintended second or third-order outcomes. However, decisiveness is not its distinguishing feature, and the challenge is reaction time.

Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO charter establish fundamental rules for how the alliance consults and acts. Article 4 effectively states that any nation can bring security issues and concerns to the North Atlantic Council for debate and request NATO assistance in strengthening defense. Only four nations have used Article 4 in NATO history, the most recent being Poland when Russia seized Crimea. Turkey had previously used Article 4 three times: in 2003, at the commencement of the Iraq War, in June 2012, when Syria shot down a Turkish military jet, and in October 2012, following Syrian strikes in Turkey.

Article 5 is the foundation of a core NATO principle: collective defense. According to the article, if a NATO ally is the victim of an armed attack, every other member of the alliance will consider this act of violence an armed attack on all members and will take whatever actions are necessary to help the attacked ally. NATO has only used Article 5 once, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

NATO's most fast response capacity is airpower. The NATO Response Force, which includes an air component, is designed for crisis response and can do three things: deploy as a standalone force for Article 5 operations or non-Article 5 crisis response, deploy as an initial entry force until larger forces arrive, and deploy as a deterrent force.

Even under Article 5, the NATO staffing and consensus process might be lengthy. When NATO achieves an agreement, states must still provide force capabilities for the agreed-upon action. Individual NATO nations may conduct unilateral or multilateral action outside of NATO during this waiting time.

Libya is one example of the lengthy consensus process. While NATO finally endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions and conducted Operation Unified Protector, the first operations did not take place until March 27, 2011, nearly ten days after the UN Security Council Resolutions were published and several months after France began the initial strikes. By the time NATO took over, a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations was already carrying out combat air operations.

5.2 EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

5.2.1 Ukrainian War

On February 24th, 2022, Russia unleashed an unrighteous, illegitimate, and illegal attack on Ukraine's territory, threatening both the national security of Ukraine and of the whole European continent, and disturbing the peace and security of the area. NATO condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and in collaboration with the Allies continues to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defense. Apart from the unjust annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO also condemns Russia's illegal attempt to annex four

regions of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia – in September 2022, which is the largest attempted annexation of European territory by force since the Second World War.⁴⁵

Vilnius Summit 2023⁴⁶

Earlier this year, in July 2023, as the unrighteous war in Ukraine continues, NATO reached a decision at the Vilnius Summit that upgrades the role of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence, as key for indivisible security:

NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) remains key for credible deterrence and defense of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. Allied IAMD deployments, including those on the Eastern flank in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as exercises and training, demonstrate Allied solidarity and resolve. Based on the Strategic Concept, the new baseline for deterrence and defense posture agreed upon in Madrid in 2022, and the new generation of defense plans, NATO continues to strengthen its IAMD by improving IAMD readiness, responsiveness, effectiveness, and interoperability, as well as the availability of airspace. NATO and Allies continue to improve IAMD capabilities, such as surveillance, interceptors, and command and control.

Moreover, Russian aggression highlighted the missile defense as complemented by the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. Allies remain committed to the full development of NATO BMD, to pursue the Alliance's collective defense, and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

⁴⁵"NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine." 2023. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm.

⁴⁶"Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2023)." 2023. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

Eastern Flank Air Defense⁴⁷



An important component of NATO's deterrence and defense posture is military presence in the eastern part of Alliance territory. In recent years, the Allies have enhanced NATO's forward presence by establishing multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. They have also sent

more planes and troops to NATO's eastern flank, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. These actions demonstrate the Allies' solidarity, determination, and ability to defend Alliance territory and populations.

Since the beginning of Russia's attack on Ukraine NATO has taken measures to shield its member States along the eastern flank from potential aggression. In the air, Allied Air Command commands and employs military aircraft from the nations and NATO to execute enhanced Vigilance Activities. NATO has substantially increased the number of fighter jets on alert across Eastern Europe in response to Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine.

NATO's enhanced vigilance is a powerful statement of Alliance resolve and cohesion that demonstrates their commitment to protect every inch of NATO territory of all Allies: NATO air forces have bolstered their presence in the eastern part of the Alliance helping to shield NATO against any aggression. Several dozen fighter jets are on alert at any time to respond to possible airspace violations and to deter aggression. Allied Air Command integrates the Allied air forces' fighters, air-to-air refueling and transport aircraft as well as Allied and NATO airborne warning and control (AWACS) platforms into the standing arrangements to safeguard the skies above the Allies. These assets enable NATO to patrol the Allied airspace and have 24/7 situational awareness above NATO and adjacent territory. A Joint Force Air

⁴⁷NATO Allied Air Command. 2022. "Allies stand together to bolster NATO's eastern flank." Allied Air Command. https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/nato_eAV_air.

Component (JFAC) was set up at Allied Air Command to plan, task, and control Allied aircraft flying enhanced Vigilance Activities.

To conclude, the war in Ukraine indicated that the security environment changes rapidly and the efforts of our Alliance to ensure Deterrence and Defence have to be continuous, in order to increase our readiness, integrate our newly added members, and demonstrate our commitment to protect every inch of NATO territory of all our Allies.

5.2.2 Strategic Airlift

An important change in airspace security is the introduction of the Strategic Airlift⁴⁸ whose capabilities are vital to ensuring that NATO Allies and partners are able to deploy their forces and equipment rapidly to wherever they are needed. There are currently three initiatives aimed at providing the Alliance and participating partner countries with strategic airlift capabilities: the Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS) initiative, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), and the Multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Fleet (MMF).

1. Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS)

The Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS) is a Support Partnership of nine countries in support of national, NATO and EU operations and missions. SALIS participating countries are provided with assured access to strategic airlift capability for outsized cargo based on an agreed quota of flight hours per year. The capability is coordinated on a day-to-day basis by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell, which is co-located with the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) based in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.

2. Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)

The second initiative aimed at providing NATO Allies and partners with access to strategic airlift is the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). The Heavy Airlift Wing is operated by military personnel from all participating countries, and its missions support national requirements. Operations have included support peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief programs,

⁴⁸Topic: Strategic airlift." 2023. NATO.int. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50107.htm.

such as the International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan), and humanitarian aid in Haiti and Pakistan. The SAC also transported essential personal protective equipment to several of its members during the peak of COVID-19 in 2020.

3. Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Fleet (MMF)

The Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Fleet (MMF) provides strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, and medical evacuation capabilities to participating countries. The program is based on a pooling and sharing concept, outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in which participating countries pool the aircraft and share costs while benefitting from economies of scale.

5.2.3 Cyber Threats

NATO has already recognized cyberspace, as a domain of operations, that has been categorized, as a form of unconventional, hybrid warfare that threatens national and international security. The global aviation system is one of the most complex and integrated systems of information and communication technology in the world. It is recognized as a critical infrastructure and a potential target for cyber-attacks. Therefore, NATO policies and guidelines must act upon the protection of its airspace from cyberattacks.

Air forces, in particular, rely heavily on cyberspace's Computer and Information Systems CIS and Information Technology to carry out their missions and for this reason, the defense of its CIS/IT has always been one of NATO's principal responsibilities, to protect its ability to connect the Alliance, support projects and conduct operations and missions. For this purpose, there have been several agencies:⁴⁹

In the process of concluding the more profitable way to enhance cyber security in airspace, we can focus on 3 broad areas:

⁴⁹You can find a detailed list of those agencies here: Hodyr, Elzbieta. "Cybersecurity of Air Force". *Cybersecurity and Law* 8 no. 2 (2022): 56-69. doi:10.35467/cal/157124, "NATO's Consultation and Command Networks." n.d. NCI Agency. Accessed August 12, 2023. <https://www.ncia.nato.int/what-we-do/nato-consultation-command-networks.html>, "The Navigation Warfare Test Bed." n.d. NATO STO. Accessed August 12, 2023. <https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-MSG-094/MP-MSG-094-17.pdf>.

1. Traditional IT: includes Internet Protocol router networks as well as IT-based weapons systems including NATO's Combined Air Operation Centres and other personnel and logistic systems.
2. Operational Technology (OT): refers to computer-controlled physical processes or other types of control systems.
3. Platforms: includes aircraft and any other weapon system operated by the Alliance and its members.

With this in mind, the best way to effectively defend NATO's aviation capabilities and systems from cyber-attacks is through a combination of defense in depth, resiliency, and advanced defense measures. Resiliency in defending NATO and its members' aviation systems will require flexibility, reducing attack surfaces, and reacting dynamically to cyber-attacks. To react dynamically to cyber-attacks, defenders of the global aviation system need to develop better situational awareness of their own networks and develop intelligence capabilities to understand what potential adversaries are planning.

5.2.4 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)⁵⁰

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have recently presented a new challenge to AP missions. With better technology, lower costs, and wider availability, there is a 'boom' in the use of these flying gadgets. In addition to the adoption of norms and regulations for personal and commercial use, there is a need for preventive and defensive measures against non-cooperative civilian and military unmanned aircraft violations of territorial airspace. NATO's AP mission must now evolve to respond to this new and demanding technology.

Interceptions of non-NATO military aircraft, civilian lost communication occurrences, and engagements with unidentified RPAS are all managed using AP procedures. Once an RPAS is discovered but not necessarily recognized, the Air C2 structure must answer challenging questions to decide if it is a threat. Threat assessment utilizes defined Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) designed to cope with manned threats. In an RPAS situation, the Air C2 structure must respond promptly and properly to the following

⁵⁰"NATO Air Policing against Unmanned Aircraft - Joint Air Power Competence Centre," Joint Air Power Competence Centre - NATO's Advocate to Air and Space Power, April 28, 2022, <https://www.japcc.org/articles/nato-air-policing-against-unmanned-aircraft/>.

questions: Is the RPAS functioning like a rogue aircraft, putting it under the control of national authorities? Is the fighter aircraft maneuverable enough to allow for visual identification, or is the RPAS flying too low and slow? Is the RPAS even visible to the pilot of the fighter aircraft? Then, if the decision is made to shoot down an RPAS, will the fighter always be able to complete the kill? What if, while searching for its target, the million-dollar fighter aircraft collides with and is damaged by an RPAS (which most certainly costs less than one-hundredth the price of the fighter aircraft), similar to the 2011 mid-air collision between a C-130 and an RPAS in Afghanistan? Can anti-aircraft systems on the ground be deployed instead? With the ROE and SOPs in place, answering these questions is difficult.

While civilian authorities struggle to reach an agreement on how to control thousands of RPAS flying today, nations are also becoming aware of the significant difficulties and potential risks that this developing technology poses to their security. NATO must now consider its AP protocols obsolete and develop new techniques to cope with this new generation of RPAS threats.

Armed helicopters are the most effective weapon against RPAS that cannot be intercepted by fighter jets. In practice, no nation has enough airframes or bases to defend all of its airspace against RPAS with only helicopters. **As a result, the interaction between national air defense commanders and intelligence services will be required to establish the most likely targets to protect and the most likely places where RPAS could cross national borders.**

NIAMD operates under a political and legal framework that adapts to new problems and is backed by political will. Except in cases where an Alliance nation invokes national caveats in the procedural framework and regains control of assets allocated to the AP mission, the AP component of NIAMD is responsible for fighting threats posed by military and civilian aircraft, including RPAS. The introduction of RPAS has ushered in a new era of technical innovation in aviation, posing significant political, legal, and technological challenges to the current AP structure. With RPAS being utilized by more than just militaries, and terrorist organizations demonstrating their willingness to employ technology in ways nations cannot always predict or plan for, the need for comprehensive but cost-effective solutions against RPAS is growing.

6. COOPERATION WITH THE EU

The Northern Alliance and the European Union operate, particularly, in the European continent and share a great number of members. For this reason, the preservation of peace and security is a common primary objective and, for this sole purpose, the two international entities have close cooperation both with EU and non-EU members, to achieve that. NATO and the EU have distinct but complementary roles in addressing air security challenges. NATO focuses on collective defense and military aspects, while the EU emphasizes civilian capabilities, crisis management, and coordination of resources. In order to enhance preparedness, information sharing is a necessity. Both organizations share information and assessments regarding common security challenges, including potential threats posed by terrorism, cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare, and regional conflicts. Moreover, through Air Policing missions, regular joint exercises and training sessions are conducted to improve interoperability between NATO and EU member states' air forces. This enhances the ability to coordinate and respond effectively to various security scenarios.⁵¹

Cooperation on Air and Missile Defense in Europe: ⁵²

In recent years, NATO and the European Union have prioritized multinational collaboration to bolster European air and missile defense to address the widening gap between threats and capabilities.

NATO's collective air defense role, which was established in the early Cold War period, is centered on two permanent tasks: IAMD and BMD. In recent years, air and missile defense has emerged as a priority for NATO capability development, with three of twenty-one High Visibility Projects (HVPs) devoted to GBAD, counter rockets, artillery, and mortars (C-RAM), and tactical C2.

⁵¹ Nato, "Relations with the European Union," NATO, June 29, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.

⁵² Monaghan, Sean, and John Christianson. "Making the Most of the European Sky Shield Initiative." Making the Most of the European Sky Shield Initiative, n.d. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-most-european-sky-shield-initiative>.

Unlike NATO, the European Union does not have permanent missions such as BMD or IAMD throughout Europe. As a result, air and missile defense have not been prioritized for the development of EU capabilities.

Recent assessments, however, identify air and missile defense as an urgent priority to reinforce in the short term, a priority to upgrade in the short to medium term, and a "high-impact capability goal" to help "win the future" in the long term through high-end air defense systems that defend against threats such as hypersonic missiles and unmanned aerial systems.

According to the European Union's 2022 Strategic Compass, EU forces would deploy in "nonpermissive" situations, which include a variety of air threats ranging from missiles to RPA. As a result, it identifies the necessity for new air and missile defense systems, which are one of six "capability focus areas."

Sky Shield:

Sky Shield was unveiled on the eve of a NATO Ministers of Defense meeting on October 13, 2022. Given the current condition of European air and missile defense capabilities, as well as the limited extent of international NATO and EU projects aimed at filling the gaps, Sky Shield may have arrived just in time. The most straightforward question about Sky Shield is which countries have joined it. There were 15 countries when it first launched. Denmark and Sweden joined in February 2023, bringing the total to 17. This group of nations is solely focused on north, east, and central Europe—or NATO's eastern front.

In July 2023, neutral governments Austria and Switzerland issued a declaration of intent to join the movement, raising concerns about the future and practicality of their neutrality stance. France, on the other hand, has criticized the project, claiming that German plans rely too heavily on equipment and technology manufactured outside of Europe. It has been stated that the French government is displeased with the exclusion of the French-Italian SAMP-T system from ESSI. France presented a counter-proposal in June 2023 and has been urging other countries to consider the alternatives. Several major European countries, including France, Poland, Italy, and Spain, had not decided whether to join the ESSI as of July 2023.

Despite its infancy, Sky Shield has the potential to fill Europe's air and missile defense deficiencies, given its high political profile and the number of members it has already garnered. The main question is whether it will be successful.

Challenges:

Various challenges could jeopardize the Sky Shield initiative.

- When domestic imperatives to grow national armies and defense industries compete with cooperation, the strategic cacophony problem arises. Poland's conspicuous absence from Sky Shield comes after a difficult period between Warsaw and Berlin, including a public spat over the deployment of German Patriot systems to Poland, given Warsaw's recent commitment to developing its own short- and medium-range GBAD systems in collaboration with the UK.
- The strategic fit issue is concerned with overcoming significant national disparities in strategic culture, priorities, and so on. Sky Shield will need strong leadership and inventive ways to navigate both difficulties among 17 members. According to one Sky Shield assessment, "important European partners, particularly France and Italy, are currently unwilling to follow Germany's lead." The lack of political unity demonstrates that Germany's approach does not adequately address European security interests, has failed to persuade allies, and leaves many concerns unsolved on the strategic, military, industrial, and economic levels.
- The specialization quandary threatens dependence on others to provide common capabilities. Specialization is unavoidable for Sky Shield since not every nation in Europe can afford to design and deploy an independent air defense system. Smaller nations, for example, that cannot afford to purchase or maintain complicated systems must rely on others to protect them against long-range missile threats. Through NATO's Air Policing and Air Shielding duties, some specialization already exists.
- International defense planning and collaborative procurement: While NATO and the European Union have multinational defense planning processes that can assist in aligning international requirements and conducting joint procurement, they are

insufficient for Sky Shield, which will need to develop its own planning process and joint procurement methods.

7. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ALLIED AIRSPACE:

Air policing (AP) is one of the core activities of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD) in peacetime, given the fact that nations' security is at risk even during ostensibly tranquil periods. The mission of AP is to enforce each Alliance nation's sovereignty and provide security for its population by enforcing national laws within internationally recognized airspace. Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) (QRA (I)) aircraft, the Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), and the Air Command and Control (Air C2) system perform these functions.

NATO is often regarded as the most powerful military alliance in history. The punch of its air forces is a critical component of its might. However, this element, known as "air power" in specialist circles, should not be regarded as unchangeable. On the contrary, it must be adapted to current and future security policy issues in order to meet the needs connected with aggressor deterrence and the performance of current mission-related activities.

To adapt to the strategic and operational difficulties, NATO will need to conceptually redefine its approach to air defense in Europe. Air defense, rather than being a stand-alone mission, will need to be nested within an operational concept that expressly relates it to a campaign plan in which a joint force ends the strategic threat and active air defense is only part of the answer. Making this aim explicit ensures that the dialogue, as well as strategic, operational, and tactical planning, are not complicated by differences such as "air defense," "ballistic missile defense," "cruise missile defense," and similar distinctions. While such distinctions are significant from a technical standpoint, the threat they provide when combined is what must be addressed, planned for, and countered. As a result, IAMD must address all threat categories in a unified manner.

While NATO may confront multiple challenging air defense issues in the future, the alliance must weigh the benefits with the costs of large modernization. The key to addressing these difficulties is to (1) engage in critical research for low-cost mid- and long-term system designs,

and (2) phase the introduction of solutions in accordance with the life-cycle replacement of existing equipment. The most urgently needed investments in research are breakthroughs in look-down radar technology, which will allow us to design future systems on high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs and satellites while avoiding significant prime-power requirements.

Long-term, staggered introductions of new capabilities to further safeguard civil airplanes (e.g., electronic locks, automatic loitering at the start of a hijack attempt) are instances of long-term, phased introductions that are consistent with aircraft and ATC system evolution. The key to both approaches is a flexible decision-making mechanism that avoids tying NATO into a spiral of costly, premature upgrades.

8. POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED:

1. What “non-traditional threats” originate from domestic, foreign, or international airspace is NATO currently facing?
2. How can NATO increase the effectiveness of IAMD?
3. How can NATO maintain an acceptable economic impact on air defense without burdening the developed member states?
4. What are the challenges of unfriendly non-kinetic operations and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) to integrated air and missile defense and how will NATO form a new approach to deal with those challenges?
5. How could NATO serve more efficiently as a signal of assurance to its member states and a deterrent to potential aggressors on a regional scale?
6. How should NATO’s presence in the Eastern Flank be altered regarding the Russian threat following the invasion of Ukraine?
7. How can NATO contribute to the development of the “Sky Shield Initiative”?
8. How can new Scandinavian members be integrated into the Air Policing Missions?

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